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Executive Summary 
Lobbying has traditionally been an enterprise of national interest organizations, which chiefly seek to 
influence national actors, governments in particular. However, national interest organizations are 
increasingly targeting the European Union as well. As the EU agenda expands in depth and scope, 
interest organizations at national and EU political levels might be expected to align in coalitions in 
order to influence EU legislation. Such strategies could increase the political leverage of interest 
organizations significantly – yet, lobbying coalitions consisting of organizations aligned to different 
political levels are little-studied. Therefore, the first aim of this article is to present a case where 
coalition lobbying would appear highly likely: the lobbying strategies employed by the interest 
organizations of Germany’s energy industries in the process leading up to the EU’s Renewable Energy 
Directive. These industries are represented by various organizations at the national and European levels.  
Secondly, the article examines how the Renewables Directive came about, as the outcome has profound 
impact on power production and consumption, and future prospects for EU mitigation of greenhouse 
gases. Considerable controversy accompanied the legal proscriptions against support mechanisms for 
enhancing renewable energy production in particular. Two of the organizations that would be the most 
severely affected by the Directive were the European utilities industry and renewables industry, together 
constituting all power producers and their affiliates in Europe. These industries disagreed deeply on 
core issues, such as legislation on support mechanisms for expanding production of renewable energy in 
the EU. The utilities industry favoured an EU-wide green certificate scheme, whereas the renewables 
industry pressed for national choice of support mechanisms. But, because the stakes were high, both had 
considerable incentives for investing substantial resources in lobbying on this legislation.    
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Thirdly, the article discusses what such multi-level lobbying reveals about perceptions of where real 
decision making power is located in the EU. Energy policy is traditionally a strong national domain, 
which makes the governance theory of liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) relevant. However, with the 
EU increasingly expanding its legislation on energy issues, also multi-level governance theory (MLG) 
might describe how interest organizations perceive power as located when EU legislation is formulated.  
The results indicate that, despite that all the lobbying that organizations targeted towards the German 
government, which played a key role in the negotiations, observations of lobbying behaviour are better 
described by MLG than LI. The limited leverage of LI is illustrated by three points: First, all the 
German interest organizations lobbied institutions at both the national and at the EU levels. Second, 
national and European interest organizations participated in informal multi-level political coalitions 
consisting of a broad church of actors, as regards the renewables industry in particular. By coordinating 
political positions, pooling resources and developing common strategies, the interest organizations 
probably increased their leverage substantially, not least because these coalitions also were backed by 
governments in key member-states and members of the European Parliament. Third, all the EU-level 
interest organizations lobbied both the core EU institutions and central national governments.  
These findings indicate that multi-level strategies should be considered for inclusion in analyses of 
national and European-level interest organizations’ lobbying of EU legislation. The interest 
organizations themselves seem to see power as distributed across multiple levels of governance, and 
lobby accordingly. In order to comprehend the momentum of the lobbying process, it appears relevant 
to assess coordination of strategies between interest organizations at different levels in complex multi-
level advocacy coalitions. By showing that all organizations concerned, regardless of size or resources, 
lobbied at multiple governance levels, this study also nuances the picture of which actors participate in 
EU policymaking. When legislation on crucial issues is created, small national interest organizations 
might also target EU institutions. Finally, at least one national interest organization cooperated with 
private companies to share tasks and enhance lobbying strength. Such cooperation between an interest 
organization and its private members is a relevant topic for future research.  
Keywords 
Coalition lobbying; interest organizations; political strategies; European Union; EU governance; EU 
energy and climate policy.  
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As the EU expands the depth and scope of its responsibilities, multi-level lobbying becomes 
increasingly relevant for interest organizations as a strategy for achieving their political aims. 
By joining coalitions in order to enhance lobbying strength, interest organizations may 
significantly enhance their capacity for influence. The literature on EU lobbying in general, 
and connected to specific fields of EU legislation, is growing rapidly. Still, relatively few in-
depth studies concern lobbying by interest organizations in complex multi-level advocacy 
coalitions within the EU, particularly with regard to EU energy policy. Understanding more 
about this phenomenon is important for several reasons, not least for a better grasp of political 
decision making in the European Union and of interest organization strategies.   
The EU Directive on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources 
(Directive 2009/28/EC, ‘Renewables Directive’) is well suited for illustrating the influence 
and coalition behaviour of interest organizations across political levels, especially because of 
the controversy and the high stakes for the involved organizations. After a prolonged and 
heated conflict involving actors from states, Directorates General, the European Parliament, 
the European Council, EU agencies, interest organizations and companies, the Commission 
significantly altered the final draft proposal regarding its most controversial part: support 
mechanisms for boosting the production of renewable energy in the EU. Under the final 
Directive, member-states may continue to choose support mechanisms themselves and trade 
so-called ‘green certificates’ only under certain conditions. Toke (2008, p. 3003) and Nilsson 
et al. (2009) argue that one important reason for this change was efficient lobbying and large-
scale political mobilization by a broad coalition of ‘green’ organizations, especially those 
representing the European renewables industry.
2
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 ‘Industry’ is here understood as all the organizations, businesses and other enterprises connected to a particular 
For understanding more about the nature of multi-level lobbying, the role of the 
interest organizations representing the German energy industries in the negotiations leading to 
the Renewables Directive is particularly relevant. Such lobbying normally requires substantial 
resources and is not a feasible option for all interest organizations, small businesses in 
particular (Eising, 2007a). National interest organizations logically emphasize the national 
level, but some studies have shown that many also lobby at the EU level, provided that they 
are adequately endowed with resources (e.g. Bouwen, 2004; Klüver, 2010; Dür and Mateo, 
2012). The German renewables industry and the utilities industry are Europe’s largest within 
their sectors and can probably afford to pursue such lobbying strategies (Dagger, 2009; BMU, 
2011). Moreover, Germany is regarded as a key country in the negotiations (see Toke, 2008; 
Boasson and Wettestad, 2013). Thirdly, German interest organizations are particularly likely 
to engage in multi-level lobbying, because, as noted by Eising (2007c, p. 351) they tend to be 
more specialized in their interest representation, be better endowed, control more policy 
information and also prioritize EU institutions more than interest organizations from other 
countries. Finally, inclusion of the German energy industries’ European-level interest 
organizations is relevant for exploring the cooperation and coordination of strategies across 
political levels. As founding members of their European umbrella organizations, German 
interest organizations are likely to have good contacts with their Brussels-based 
representatives.  
There is reason to believe that the Commission also was dependent on input from 
interest organizations. As complexity generally increases the influence of interest 
organizations (see Klüver, 2013, p. 182), high-quality policy information was probably 
paramount in the creation of the Renewables Directive. Summing up, if there was multi-level 
cooperation and coordination as regards the Renewables Directive, German interest 
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organizations were probably involved.  
Lobbying is perhaps best viewed as a ‘complex collective process’ (Klüver, 2013, p. 
53); however, this study focuses mainly on alliances that are intentionally created, not just 
organizations that push in the same direction because of similar policy goals.   
The dynamics underlying the Renewables Directive are complex in terms of the 
number of political actors, issues and levels involved (see Nilsson et al., 2009). Handled with 
as ‘highly sensitive information’, the strategies of interest organizations are largely invisible 
to the public. Therefore, analysis of the processes connected with the Directive requires an 
extensive descriptive account and analysis, in order to answer the following research 
questions as precisely and completely as possible:   
1) What lobbying strategies did the interest organizations of Germany’s energy industries use to 
influence the formulation of the EU Renewables Directive?  
2) What do these strategies tell about their perceptions of where the real decision making power in the 
EU is situated? Is it located at the national level, or at the national and the EU levels? 
 
Using a large-N sample, Eising (2004) has tested the ‘grand governance theories’ about how 
EU functions on the observed behaviour of interest organizations. However, few researchers 
have tested expectations derived from these different theories on the empirical observations of 
interest organization lobbying on a single EU directive. Arguably, theory testing is the most 
ambitious use of case studies. This article investigates the lobbying behaviour of several 
interest organizations representing German energy industries, assessing observations against 
expectations derived from Moravcsik’s (1993) liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) and Hooghe 
and Marks’ (2001) multi-level governance (MLG) theories. Comparing observations with 
predictions, observations are used for testing and evaluation of the theory-based approaches.  
Why use these theories in such a design? First, liberal intergovernmentalism is 
indicated because energy policy has traditionally been a strong national domain (see e.g. 
Nilsson et al., 2009). Second, the EU is increasingly developing more authority in the field of 
energy policy, and the renewables and utilities industries possess sufficient resources to 
conduct multi-level lobbying. The conditions for lobbying behaviour in line with MLG theory 
are therefore also met. Third, both LI and MLG are regarded as two of the most influential 
and relevant theories on EU integration today, in research and in the public debate. Finally, 
Franchino (2005) and others have called for more theory-testing studies of EU governance 
structures. This article is a part of the on-going research project, ‘The EU Energy and Climate 
Package: Causes, Content and Consequences’ (ECPack).   
Theory-testing case studies usually take the form of either a most-likely case or least-
likely case format to give maximum leverage to the conclusions (Eckstein, 1975). However, a 
given case may also be analysed against two rival theories – which is the approach employed 
here. The present study may prove particularly fruitful for confronting the two theories by 
offering what amounts to a most-likely case for both LI and MLG. In other words, if one of 
the two theories fails to account for the process, it should be seen as considerably weakened in 
explaining interest organizations’ perceptions of power relations in EU energy policy.  
Several studies have analysed aspects of the Renewables Directive. Toke (2008), 
Nilsson et al. (2009), and Boasson and Wettestad (2010 and 2013) have examined the political 
processes at the EU level, explaining the end results by means of various theoretical 
approaches in causal analyses. Toke (2008) focuses on the organizations that were for and 
against trading of green certificates and analyses the support mechanisms. An advocacy 
coalition framework (ACF) is used by Nilsson et al. (2009) to explore why the trading of 
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green certificates was rejected as an EU-wide system. Boasson and Wettestad (2010; 2013) 
explain the outcomes regarding governance of the EU climate and energy package by several 
theories. However, relatively little scholarly attention has been devoted to investigating in 
detail the lobbying processes focusing on interest organizations’ strategies across levels. This 
study thus also nuances the picture of how exactly the directive was created.  
This article is organized as follows: the second section outlines LI and MLG as theory 
frameworks and formulates hypotheses based on them. Section three introduces the research 
methods used and the cases, and the fourth section presents the empirical observations of 
actual lobbying behaviour. The fifth section discusses whether the observations match the 
hypotheses and how this relates to the literature on EU lobbying. Last, the sixth section offers 
a summary and conclusions.  
 
Theory background: lobbying in intergovernmental and multi-
level governance systems 
How does the lobbying behaviour of interest organizations change as the EU expands in depth 
and scope? As utility-maximizing actors, interest organizations should lobby where the power 
is located. Thus, lobbying patterns should reveal where the interest organizations perceive 
power in the EU system to be located.  
Liberal intergovernmentalism emphasizes that national governments act as the predominant 
decision makers in international negotiations. Implicitly, interest organizations are then less 
important for political outcomes than are politicians in government. Governments may 
delegate some authority to supranational institutions, but only in order to achieve specific 
goals such as economic growth and prosperity. Moravcsik (1993) created a theory that many 
view as aimed at explaining the large intergovernmental conferences (IGCs), but here it is  
argued that, by extension, the theory also encompasses negotiations on secondary legislation 
on issues where member-states have retained a high degree of self-determination, such as 
energy policy. Moreover, as Moravcsik and Schimmelpfennig (2009, p. 74) stress: 
 […] recent empirical research suggests that LI theory applies far more broadly than commonly 
suggested, including much everyday EU decisionmaking. The reason is that many decisions within the 
EU are taken by de facto consensus or unanimity, even when the formal rules seem to dictate otherwise.  
As a part of the EU Climate and Energy Package, the Renewables Directive was subject to the 
co-decision procedure, requiring final consensus in the European Council and the European 
Parliament. That makes LI applicable to this case. According to this theory, in negotiations 
requiring de facto consensus, policymaking in the EU is thus only to a very limited extent 
determined by the EU institutions themselves. Policymaking should instead be understood as 
the result of intergovernmental negotiations by sovereign national governments (Moravcsik, 
1993, pp. 474–480; Moravcsik, 1998, pp. 7–9; Hooghe and Marks 2001, p. 2). Here the key 
member-states are essential for understanding the negotiation outcomes (Sverdrup, 1999). In 
such situations, lobbying EU institutions will have limited effect because they exert little 
independent impact on decisions made there. If interest organizations perceive EU 
negotiations this way, they can be expected to focus on lobbying member-state governments.  
Research expectation: 
The energy industries’ national and European interest organizations lobbied the German government, but 
paid little attention to influencing policymakers in the EU, such as members of the European Parliament or 
the Commission. 
According to MLG, the EU’s collective decisionmaking processes will lead national 
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governments to lose control over decisions of importance to them. The political levels of 
governance are mutually interdependent. MLG therefore implies that political actors like 
interest organizations will lobby on various political levels to exert influence, working across 
regional, national and supranational arenas. On this assumption, interest organizations will 
target EU institutions because these are influential lobbying targets in their own right. MLG 
does not claim that the nation-state has lost its role as the most important unit in international 
negotiations, but rather that the EU level is also crucial (Hooghe and Marks 2001, p. 4). This 
is supported by empirical observations, for example Coen and Richardson’s (2009, p. 7) 
account of how interest organizations lobby in the EU: 
As a result, we no longer see EU interest politics in terms of ‘bottom–up’ national interests feeding into 
the EU, or ‘top–down’ coordination of EU lobbying, rather we see a managed multilevel process with 
numerous feedback loops and entry points constrained by the size of the interest organization, lobbying 
budgets, origin and the policy area.   
Several developments make the EU institutions attractive lobbying targets. The Commission, 
the EU’s multipurpose executive body, has become more and more independent of the 
member-states, increasingly constituting a higher level of governance than the national 
governments (see e.g. Egeberg, 2006, pp. 1–3). The Lisbon Treaty and several other EU 
reforms have given the European Parliament enlarged powers. For instance, more and more 
issues are handled under the co-decision procedure (today called the ‘ordinary legislative 
procedure’). These legal reforms serve to give power to the EU institutions at the expense of 
national sovereignty – in turn making these institutions increasingly attractive and important 
as lobbying targets. According to MLG, interest organizations therefore should lobby both the 
EU institutions and the relevant government(s) intensively.  
Research expectation: 
In the case of the Renewables Directive, the industries’ national and European interest organizations 
lobbied the Commission, the European Parliament, the European Council and the German government 
intensively.  
Method and data 
In line with prominent case-study methodologists like George and Bennett (2005, p. 214), we 
argue that the case-study method is useful for testing theories on data that describe micro-
level phenomena. Theory-testing case studies usually take the form of either a most-likely 
case or a least-likely case study to give maximum leverage to the conclusions (Eckstein, 
1975). However, as noted, a given case may also be analysed against two rival theories. To 
test the theories, this study employs the congruence method (pattern matching), which 
proceeds by formulating observable expectations from each theory, and then testing the 
degree of compliance between these and observable outcomes (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 
181; Gerring, 2007, p. 45). In addition, process tracing has been used to obtain an indication 
of the effects of coalition-building on the impact that the interest organizations had on the 
Renewables Directive. Case studies can be used for making analytical rather than statistical 
generalizations (Yin, 2009). Conclusions from this study can therefore be drawn to help in 
understanding the causes and pathways of lobbying in the EU, but also to strengthen, 
exemplify, weaken or nuance claims made in recent studies of EU lobbying, such as Klüver 
(2013, p. 152): ‘Lobbying in the European [Union] is instead a truly multilevel endeavour in 
which both national and European interest organizations are equally active.’  
The organizations interviewed represent the German energy industries at the national 
and at the EU level. These can roughly be divided into two sectors/industries: the utilities 
industry
3
 and the renewables industry.
4
 There exist many organizations representing these 
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industries in one way. The  organizations studied here were selected on the basis of the size of 
the technologies they represent in terms of the quantity of energy production they contribute.
5
 
The utilities industries’ national-level interest organizations are: German Association of 
Energy and Water Industries (Bundesverband der Energie und Wasserwirtschaft, BDEW) and 
Federation of German Industry (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, BDI). At the 
European level, the Union of the Electricity Industry (EURELECTRIC) has this role. The 
renewables industry is here represented by the umbrella organization German Renewable 
Energy Federation (Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energie, BEE), the more specialized 
German Bioenergy Association (Bundesverband BioEnergie, BBE) and German Wind Energy 
Association (Bundesverband WindEnergie, BWE). At the European level, the renewables 
industry’s interest organizations include the European Wind Energy Association (EWEA), the 
European Photovoltaic Industry Association (EPIA), and the European Renewable Energies 
Federation (EREF). The European umbrella organization of the renewables sector is the 
European Renewable Energy Council (EREC).  
The reasons for choosing interest organizations at the national and the EU political 
levels were: a) to identify coordination and cooperation across the political levels; b) some of 
them (EWEA, EPIA and EREF) have German companies and associations as individual 
members and thus represent their interests directly in Brussels; and c) all these have German 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
large companies producing electricity and heat from nuclear power, coal, gas and hydropower, and their 
equipment suppliers.  
4
 The renewables industry may be defined as the producers of energy from renewable energy sources and their 
affiliates, such as renewables equipment manufacturers. Many utilities companies also produce electricity from 
renewable energy sources. However, the distinction is appropriate because the companies that mainly produce 
conventional power and the companies that focus on producing power from the ‘new’ renewable energy 
technologies have often had very different political interests, in Germany and in the EU.   
5
 The largest renewable energy technologies apart from hydropower in Germany at the time were bio-power, 
wind power and solar power. Hydropower is not included because power produced from this source is already 
cost-competitive in comparison to, for instance, power from coal; it therefore does not need support.  
interest organizations as founding members and therefore probably constitute important 
indirect lobbying routes for their national members. Therefore, the study follows the advice of 
Dür (2008, p. 1223): ‘In future research on interest organization influence in the EU it will be 
essential to consider the existence of distinct pathways to influence.’      
Data were collected primarily through one semi-structured interview with each 
organization in March 2011, supplemented by one conversation and one correspondence with 
two of them in June 2011. All interviews were taped and transcribed. Afterwards, the 
respondents gave feedback on the presentations of their respective organizations. Since the 
topic could be perceived as sensitive, the respondents were granted anonymity. Triangulation 
was used in order to ensure that the quality of the data was as valid and reliable as possible – 
for example, interview data were checked against written material such as press releases and 
other data gathered in document studies. Interest organizations’ representatives were asked 
how they had lobbied concerning the Renewables Directive, about their cooperation partners 
within and outside the industry, and political positions on salient issues. In addition, they were 
questioned about the kind of information they provided to decision makers, and the role of 
resources such as finances and number of personnel. 
 
What was the debate about and how did the organizations lobby?
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The Renewables Directive is a part of the EU’s Climate and Energy Package, a coordinated 
legislative strategy aimed at achieving several different major EU goals. These include 
fulfilling commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, being an international leader in the 
development and innovation of renewable energy sources, and ensuring security of energy 
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supply (European Commission, 2009). The development of renewable energy has become a 
core EU strategic priority in recent years (see European Commission, 2010). By 2020, 20 per 
cent of energy consumed is to stem from renewable energy, the Package has declared as a 
major target.
7
 If properly implemented, the Renewables Directive will contribute to a large-
scale expansion of renewable power production and innovation across the EU.     
Several systems of support mechanisms for achieving the 20 per cent target were 
conceivable. The two main options discussed were either national choice of support 
mechanisms or EU-wide trading of ‘green certificates’ (also called green electricity 
certificates, GECs, or certificates of guaranteed origin, GOs). Most EU member-states had 
chosen feed-in systems (systems with feed-in tariffs, FiTs) before the Renewables Directive 
negotiations. Although this has been a controversial issue, also in the research literature, 
evidence seems to indicate that feed-in tariffs are the most efficient in stimulating production 
of and investment in renewable energy in Europe (see e.g. Mez, 2007; Verbruggen and 
Lauber, 2012).   
The outcome of the negotiations leading up to the Renewables Directive had profound 
impacts on how and where energy would be produced. This affected particularly the industries 
affiliated with the various types of energy production. For parts of the renewables industry 
this became an almost existential fight about opportunities for survival and future prospects. 
Several issues proved controversial, for example the question of binding targets for domestic 
renewables consumption in 2020. The question of what kind of support mechanisms member-
states should be allowed to have for increasing renewable energy production has remained the 
most salient issue by far.  
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 The other main targets were reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20% from 1990 levels and improving EU 
energy efficiency by 20% within 2020. These three are famously known as the 20-20-20 targets.  
Here, there were mainly two different coalitions of interest organizations and their 
affiliates. The utilities industry, headed by BDEW in Germany and EURELECTRIC in the 
EU, were heavily engaged. They felt that allowing member-states to determine support 
mechanisms themselves would have negative effects, like leading to continuation of feed-in 
systems (which they saw as distorting the electricity markets), stimulating renewables 
expansion in suboptimal locations, being detrimental to conventional electricity producers and 
generally uneconomical for governments. In contrast, the renewables industry, headed by the 
German Renewable Energy Federation (BEE) in Germany and the European Renewable 
Energy Council (EREC) in the EU, argued that the main alternative, a Europe-wide 
certificate-based system would mean less expansion of renewables – because investment 
safety would decline; further, a certificate-based marked would be bureaucratic, and would 
lead to expansion of only the most mature renewable technologies. These opposing 
‘worldviews’ still mark the debate.8 
 
 
German utilities’ interest organizations9 
First and foremost, the utility industries’ German interest organizations in the sample, the 
German Association of Energy and Water Industries (BDEW) and the Federation of German 
Industry (BDI) lobbied the German government. The BDEW and the BDI lobbied the Federal 
Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, and the Federal 
Ministry of Economics and Technology in particular (interviews BDEW, 2011a and BDI, 
2011). Generally, the Liberals (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP) supported their views on 
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energy issues. BDI did not address the German Parliament, which had little to do with the 
Directive directly. Through committee meetings, the organizations collaborated on how an EU 
market-based system might be made, but they never declared common political positions. In 
Germany they participated in all formal hearings: BDEW on behalf of the utilities industry 
and BDI on behalf of businesses connected to utilities and the manufacturing industry (large 
energy-intensive industries in particular).  
To a considerable extent, these organizations shared views. However, BDEW was keen 
on green certificates, whereas BDI was not as positive because some members, like the 
German chemical industry, did not want another trade-based system, having had negative 
experiences with the EU Emissions Trading System. Rather than allying with BDEW, BDI 
cooperated informally with the large labour union Mining, Chemical and Energy Industrial 
Union (Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau, Chemie, Energie, IG BCE), which organizes 
employees in the utilities and the energy-intensive chemical industry. BDI and IG BCE 
prepared a common position paper to show that employers as well as employees in the 
utilities and energy-intensive industries were affected and shared views (IG BCE, 2008; 
interview BDI, 2011).   
Since the German government supported feed-in tariffs, by-passing the German 
government by focusing lobbying efforts on the EU level might be an advantageous strategy 
for the utilities industry (see Baumgarter and Jones, 1991). However, representatives of  
BDEW (interview, 2011b) and BDI (interview, 2011) denied that this was the case. Their 
Brussels offices were important for lobbying EU decisionmakers and Commission 
bureaucrats together with staff from the mother organizations. At the EU level, BDEW and 
BDI primarily lobbied the unit in charge in DG TREN in the Commission, the ITRE 
Committee in the European Parliament, and members of the European Parliament (MEPs) 
known to be sympathetic to their views (interviews BDEW, 2011b and BDI, 2011). BDEW 
had one person in Berlin and one in Brussels working on the Renewables Directive, albeit not 
full time. In addition, people in different committees worked on the Directive (interview 
BDEW, 2011b). As a large member of EURELECTRIC, BDEW is important in formulating 
their policies (interview EURELECTRIC, 2011); BDI is a member of Confederation of 
European Business (BUSINESSEUROPE). BUSINESSEUROPE and BDI largely shared 
viewpoints this case (BDI, 2008; BUSINESSEUROPE, 2008; interview BDI, 2011). Due to 
constraints of time and personnel resources, BDEW and BDI concentrated on lobbying 
friendly-minded German politicians in the European Parliament and ITRE, and the most 
central individuals, like the rapporteur Claude Turmes (interviews BDI, 2011; BDEW, 2011b). 
According to BDI, Germany made a major impact on the final outcome of the Renewables 
Directive:  
It is first and foremost due to Germany’s influence that we have quite different support mechanisms in 
Europe… and we argue that the support mechanisms should be harmonized, or at least enable trade with 
renewable energy (interview BDI, 2011).   
 
German renewables interest organizations
10
 
The German renewables interest organizations shared views on all major issues and lobbied 
through several different routes. The main target was the German government, but they also 
worked to promote the industry’s interests directly to EU institutions. They coordinated their 
activities and political positions in the committee Arbeitsgruppe Europa (AG Europa) of the 
umbrella organization German Renewable Energies Federation (interview BEE, 2011). There, 
they produced joint information such as political positions and press statements. These 
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organizations have good contacts in the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und 
Reaktorsicherheit, BMU) in particular, which is the ministry in charge of renewable energy. 
The organizations also drew on contacts within all the political parties, liaising with party 
staff specializing in renewable energy issues (interviews BEE, BWE, 2011).  
In addition to directly lobbying the Ministry for the Environment and the Federal 
Ministry of Economics and Technology (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, 
BMWi), they used two indirect lobbying channels to exert pressure on the German 
government: first, through finding ‘friendly’ politicians, particularly within the two ruling 
parties, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, 
SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union of Germany and Christian Democratic Union of 
Bavaria (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, Christlich-Soziale Union Bayern, 
CDU/CSU), but also other parties.
11
 Second, they created an informal alliance with 
environmental organizations, Greenpeace Germany in particular, but also others like Friends 
of the Earth Germany (BUND). These in turn actively lobbied the government on renewables 
policy because of these technologies’ contribution to mitigating greenhouse gas emissions 
(interviews BEE, BBE and BWE, 2011). Some types of bioenergy were harshly criticized by 
the environmental organizations (see e.g. WWF Germany et al., 2007). To get the support of 
the environmental organizations and create a better policy, the renewables industry’s interest 
organizations agreed to include sustainability criteria in their proposals (interviews BBE and 
BEE, 2011).   
Through collaborating with other renewables interest organizations, each organization 
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 The Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) and the Left (Die Linke) generally support expansion of renewable 
energies. 
gained new political contacts as well as better access to existing ones. BEE sought to build as 
broad a base of support as possible, also among the general public, so that the politicians 
would know that, if they made laws that would worsen conditions for the renewables industry, 
they would also be going against public opinion (interview BEE, 2011). A majority in the 
German Parliament, the Bundestag, shares and shared their views. Therefore, it adopted a 
resolution stating that member-states should determine support mechanisms themselves, and 
that there should be no Europe-wide trade in certificates (Dagger, 2009, p. 99).   
At the EU level, the organizations focused on lobbying friendly-minded MEPs and the 
unit in charge in DG Transport and Energy (DG TREN). Germany’s renewables interest 
organizations are founding members of, inter alia, the European Renewable Energies 
Federation (EREF) and the European Photovoltaic Industry Association (EPIA). They 
participated in meetings, exchanged information and coordinated positions and strategies with 
them to ensure that the whole European renewables industry would speak with one voice. 
These European associations constituted important indirect lobbying routes. In addition, they 
worked closely with EREC and created a network of national associations (BEE, 2011; 
interview BEE, 2011). Some staff members held positions in interest organizations at both the 
national and the EU levels, as in BWE and in EWEA, which facilitated coordination of 
viewpoints and actions targeted at politicians at both political levels. Some renewables 
interest organizations furthermore increased their leverage by cooperating with private 
companies.    
BWE also coordinated with wind energy companies (manufacturers, project operators etc.) and these 
also took the opportunity to approach politicians/ MEPs/ Commission etc. so that we were able to do 
task sharing and multiply our actions (interview BWE, 2011b).   
On most issues concerning the drafting process, the renewables industry’s interest 
organizations argued in a low-key, technical way with Commission experts. However, when it 
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came to the debate about national support schemes versus harmonized European mechanisms, 
they were quite sharp and outspoken towards the Commission. If it proposed a harmonized 
certificate trading system instead of leaving the decision about support mechanisms to the 
member-states, the Commission was bluntly criticized (interview BEE, 2011).  
Confrontation was sought only when it was absolutely necessary, and that was the question about a 
harmonized certificate trade, which would have destroyed all successful support systems for renewables 
in Europe. At this point, we did seek confrontation, we found it and we won. Differences about all other 
points could be seriously discussed and solutions found in general agreement (interview BEE, 2011). 
To some extent, the heated debates in the negotiations leading to the Renewables Directive 
were a continuation of the lengthy conflicts that had taken place in Germany on many of the 
same issues a couple of decades, with coalitions on the issue of how to support renewable 
energy in Germany, as shown in Table 1. These informal coalitions have included actors 
ranging from ministries, political parties, business organizations and civil society  to 
individual companies. Renewable energy has always enjoyed broad popular legitimacy, and 
the informal ‘ecological coalition’ has included members like major unions such as the 
German Engineering Federation (Verband Deutscher Maschinen und Anlagenbau e.V., 
VDMA), German Farmer’s Association (Deutscher Bauernverband e.V., DBV) and German 
Metalworkers’ Union (Industriegewerkschaft Metall, IG Metall), as well as a broad group of 
civil  society organizations. As several of the organizations below are umbrella organizations 
for other organizations, Table 1 also shows that the coalitions had support from organizations 
operating at the other governmental levels within Germany: the states (Länder) and the 
municipalities.  
 
 
Table 1: Coalitions on renewable energy in Germany 
 The ‘economic coalition’: supports 
market-based system 
The ‘ecologic coalition’: supports 
feed-in tariffs 
Ministries Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Technology (BMWi)  
Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature Conservation 
and Nuclear Safety (BMU) 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture and 
Consumer Protection 
(Bundesministerium für Ernährung, 
Landwirtschaft und 
Verbraucherschutz, BMELV)  
Political parties The Liberals (FDP) The Greens 
The Social Democrats (SDP) 
The Left  
A large faction of CDU/CSU 
Business organizations German Association of Energy and 
Water Industries (BDEW)  
Federation of German Industries 
(BDI)  
Association of the Industrial Energy 
and Power Industry (Verband der 
Industriellen Energie und 
Kraftwirtschaft, VIK ) 
Mining, Chemical and Energy 
Industrial Union (IG BCE) 
German Renewable Energy 
Federation (BEE) 
BEE members, e.g. the German 
Wind Energy Association 
(Bundesverband WindEnergie, 
BWE)  
German Engineering Association 
(VDMA) 
German Metalworkers' Federation 
(IG Metall)  
German Farmers’ Association (DBV) 
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Other organizations  Environmental organizations, 
Greenpeace in particular, civic 
interest organizations for 
renewable energy, municipalities 
Companies The four utilities giants: RWE, 
E.ON, EnBW and Vattenfall 
 
Manufacturers of renewable 
technologies, affiliated businesses 
Sources: Lauber and Mez (2004), Jacobsson and Lauber (2006), Dagger (2009 quoting Reiche (2004), Hirschl 
(2008) and Evert (2005), interviews BDEW (2011a) and (2011b), interviews BEE, BBE, BWE (2011).  
 
The European utility umbrella organization: EURELECTRIC
12
 
The umbrella organization EURELECTRIC participated in all formal meetings during the 
negotiations leading to the Renewables Directive, viewing this as a top priority. At the critical 
stages, EURELECTRIC had two or three people working on it full-time. The Working Group 
Energy Policy and Working Group Renewables and Distributing Generation were in charge of 
formulating EURELECTRIC’s political positions. Their efforts were mainly targeted at the 
EU institutions – like various parts of the Commission, DG TREN, DG Environment, DG 
Climate and DG Enterprise – as well as rapporteurs and party leaders in the European 
Parliament. In addition, the organization arranged personal meetings with parliamentarians 
(MEPs) and others regarded as influential, and individuals expected to be positive to their 
views (interview EURELECTRIC, 2011). As a large and well-organized organization 
representing a major sector, EURELECTRIC might have been expected to achieve its aims: 
but in the end, no certificate trade system was formulated in the Directive.   
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 EURELECTRIC and the rest of the coalition in favour of a European certificate trading system are further 
described in Table 2.  
We didn’t have a lot of support in the Parliament because they were voting along country lines. The 
clear message that came to all of them was: ‘we will have national support schemes’ (interview 
EURELECTRIC, 2011).   
EURELECTRIC left it to the members to lobby their national governments. The only close 
ally in lobbying the issue about support mechanisms at the EU level was the Renewable 
Energy Certificate System (RECS). The two collaborated intensely, according to 
EURELECTRIC’s activity report (2008a). In 2007, EURELECTRIC issued a joint press 
release with RECS and the European Forum for Electricity Traders (EFET), an indication of 
their common interests (EURELECTRIC, 2007; interview EURELECTRIC, 2011).  
 
European renewables interest organizations
13
 
At the EU level, renewables interest organizations cooperated and coordinated their political 
strategies and positions through the European Renewable Energy Council (EREC), the 
umbrella organization to which they all belong. EREC as a coalition leader issued common 
press releases for the entire European renewables industry. The Renewables Directive was 
their top priority, and represented a historic opportunity to improve investment conditions in 
many EU countries.  
I think our engagement in this directive was total, was a hundred per cent. It is one of the most far-
reaching pieces of legislation about renewable energy in the world, with all its defects and limits and 
nonetheless, you won’t find this anywhere else in the world (interview EWEA, 2011).   
They lobbied the relevant bodies within the Commission, the committee in charge in the 
European Parliament, the Committee on Industry, Transport and Energy (ITRE), and the 
Council, meeting with key governments and their permanent representations (interviews 
                                                          
13
 See Table 2 for further descriptions.  
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EWEA, EPIA and EREF, 2011). The interest organizations followed the political processes 
closely and arranged meetings with people at various political levels, ranging from 
Commission President José Manuel Barroso to the officials who drafted the proposals for the 
Directive (interviews BEE, EREF, EPIA and EWEA, 2011). A staunch supporter was the 
European Forum for Renewable Energy Sources (EURFORES) – a cross-party organization 
consisting of members of the European Parliament and of national parliamentarians, 
EUFORES was located in the Renewable Energy House in Brussels, as were most of the 
renewables interest organizations, which probably further facilitated cooperation and 
communication. Both the first rapporteur, Mechtild Rothe (Germany), and the second 
rapporteur on the Directive, Claude Turmes (Luxembourg), were very active members there. 
Otherwise these EU-level organizations depended on their national members to lobby their 
respective governments.   
Similar to the German interest organizations’ good contacts with the German 
government, the European interest organizations gave the impression of having long-
established ties to decisionmakers and officials in the EU. Also when lobbying the EU, they 
formed an informal alliance with environmental organizations, above all Greenpeace EU. For 
some years Greenpeace EU has promoted renewable energy, inter alia by commissioning and 
publishing scientific reports with future scenarios for renewable energy (see Greenpeace 
European Union, 2007; 2008). The renewables industry’s organizations at the EU level and at 
national levels made a joint effort to persuade certain governments and MEPs to oppose an 
EU-wide green certificate scheme as a harmonized support mechanism (interview EREF, 
2011). At the EU level, these interest organizations also managed to create a broad informal 
coalition that included major member-state governments:  
We also managed to get the German and Spanish governments to write a letter to the Commission that 
the Commission was not allowed, or should not come up with a harmonized green certificate scheme, 
but that it should be up to the member-states (interview EREF, 2011). 
Although the renewables industry is far smaller than the utilities industry in Europe, our data 
indicate that they, together with partners in the environmental movement and key member-
states like Germany and Spain in the Council, managed to get the Commission to amend the 
directive proposal of December 2007. The directive was subject to the co-decision procedure. 
After various amendments in 2008, the member-states were allowed to decide support 
mechanisms themselves. These amendments were finally accepted by the European 
Parliament and the Council, and became law in spring 2009. 
The key actors in the debates on each side are summarized in Table 2, showing how 
contentious the issue was. Even subunits of major companies and environmental 
organizations disagreed with the opinions of their leadership, and some member-states 
changed stance during the negotiations.   
 
Table 2: Coalitions and their affiliates at the European level  
 Pro a European certificate trading 
system 
Pro national choice of support 
mechanisms 
Commission Directorates 
General (DGs) 
DG Enterprise 
DG Environment 
Heads of DG Transport and Energy 
Other sections of DG Transport and 
Energy, DG Environment and DG 
Climate 
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Countries The UK, Finland and Belgium 
(initially), Denmark, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and Sweden 
The UK, Finland and Belgium (in 
the end), Germany, Spain, Slovenia, 
Latvia, Poland, France  
European Parliament European Conservatives and 
Reformists Group (ECR), parts of 
European People’s Party (EPP) 
The Greens/European Free Alliance 
(Greens/EFA), members of 
European Forum for Renewable 
Energy Sources (EUFORES), 
Socialist Group (today: Progressive 
Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats, S&D) 
Business organizations Union of the Electricity Industry 
(EURELECTRIC) 
European Federation of Energy 
Traders (EFET) 
Renewable Energy Certificate 
System (RECS) 
Association of Issuing Bodies (AIB) 
Confederation of European 
Business (BUSINESSEUROPE) 
European Renewable Energy 
Council (EREC) 
European Wind Energy Association 
(EWEA) 
European Photovoltaic Industry 
Association (EPIA) 
European Renewable Energies 
Federation (EREF) 
European Biomass Association 
(AEBIOM) 
The other industry associations 
that are EREC members 
Confederation of European Paper 
Industries (CEPI) 
Other organizations Subunits of some of the 
environmental organizations 
Environmental organizations like 
Greenpeace EU, Friends of the 
Earth Europe (FoE Europe), Climate 
Action Network (CAN), World 
Future Council (WFC), World 
Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF 
EU), and European Environment 
Bureau (EEB) 
Companies German utilities companies, 
including RWE, E.ON, EnBW and 
Vattenfall, most other utilities in 
Europe, companies manufacturing 
equipment for conventional power 
production 
 
The largest Spanish utility 
Iberdrola, major manufacturers of 
equipment for production of 
renewable energy, subunits of the 
large utilities companies that 
advocated GECs 
Sources: Greenpeace European Union (2007), BUSINESSEUROPE (2008), EURELECTRIC (2008b), Toke (2008), 
WWF EU (2008), Nilsson et al. (2009), Boasson and Wettestad (2010), interviews EURELECTRIC, EREF, EWEA, 
EPIA, BEE (2011) and BWE (2011b). 
 
Arguments in the debates showed quite different worldviews in terms of the best type of 
support mechanisms and how a more sustainable Europe should be built, as show in Table 3. 
These arguments were frequently used by the coalitions, for instance in press releases, 
position papers, annual reports and elsewhere, with the phrasing adjusted to suit the audience 
in question. The renewables organizations and the rest of the environmental coalition were 
aided by the EU energy policy framing, as pointed out by Nilsson et al. (2009). In particular, 
unstable Russian energy policies contributed to making security of supply a central political 
issue in many member-states. The EU had declared that innovation was the key for achieving 
targets such as future economic growth. Increased national generation of renewable energy 
would enhance domestic energy security by reducing the need for imported fossil fuels, while 
also leading to prospects of job creation and new industries with bright future prospects.  
 
Table 3: Main arguments in the German and European debates on feed-in tariffs vs. 
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green certificates 
Category The utilities industry and the rest of 
the ‘economic coalition’ arguments for 
green certificates 
The renewables industry and the rest of 
the ‘environmental coalition’ arguments 
for feed-in tariffs 
Costs GECs are more cost-efficient for society: 
green certificates give the desired 
amount of electricity at the lowest 
price.  
FiTs are the most efficient and least costly 
way of developing renewable energy 
production. Conventional energy 
production suffers from market failure; 
the real costs of non-renewable energy 
production, such as the price of pollution, 
are not included in the price.  
Allocation GECs will lead to allocation where the 
potential for renewable energy 
production is greatest in Europe, rather 
than where the subsidies are highest. 
GECs will often lead to energy production 
located far away from people and from 
where the demand for energy is.   
Fairness It is unfair for renewable energy to have 
preferential grid access, and for it to 
receive so much in indirect subsidies 
based on taxing the grid owners.14 
The utilities have good access to the grid 
because there used to be monopolies 
where the power producers also owned 
the grids. Historically, the utilities have 
received enormous amounts in subsidies. 
Renewable technologies are developing 
rapidly and should continue be supported 
until they are mature. 
The future 
and 
innovation 
Conventional energy production is 
important for Germany’s/EUs energy 
security, should not be overlooked and 
cannot be phased out easily without 
major negative consequences. 
In the future, Germany and Europe should 
run 100 per cent on renewable energy. 
Continuation of feed-in systems will lead 
to higher renewables market shares 
because the support systems promote 
investments in production capacity, which 
stimulates investments in innovation. This 
                                                          
14
 Feed-in systems are normally coupled with laws that ensure renewable energy producers the right to export 
their excess capacity to the grid regardless of how much other power is produced simultaneously.  
leads to declining prices for renewables 
technologies and enhanced investment in 
capacity.  
Employment Higher production of renewable energy 
will mean increased costs for industrial 
consumers, in turn threatening the 
competitiveness of German/European 
industries. 
The renewables industry is expected to 
expand massively, employing more and 
more people directly and indirectly giving 
Europe a competitive advantage.  
Security of 
supply 
Germany/Europe need continuity of 
supply, which only conventional energy 
sources can deliver, since wind and sun 
are intermittent energy sources that 
cannot produce electricity continually. 
Increased renewables production leads to 
increased energy security, as demand for 
import of fossil fuels declines. The 
government must invest in technologies 
and innovation for efficient storage of 
energy and expand the grid system. 
Investments FiTs do not stimulate investments in 
new and improved equipment for 
generation because installation owners 
are ensured income for years, even 
though the technologies are improving.  
A European certificate system would 
threaten the national FiT-systems. Market 
actors would invest in certificates where 
the tariffs are the higher rather than 
where for example wind power is 
produced most cheaply, e.g. in Germany. 
Sources: BDEW (2008a) and (2008b), BEE (2008a), BDI (2008), BWE (2008b), EURELECTRIC (2008b), Greenpeace 
European Union (2008), IG BCE (2008), BEE (2011a), interviews BDI, BEE, BBE, EURELECTRIC, EWEA, EPIA and 
EREF 2011, interviews BDEW 2011a and 2011b).     
 
Discussion 
To what extent do the data match the competing propositions derived from the theories of 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Multi-level Governance?  
Research expectation (LI): The energy industries’ national and European interest organizations lobbied 
the German government, but paid little attention to influencing policymakers in the EU, such as 
members of the European Parliament or the Commission. 
Research expectation (MLG): The industries’ national and European interest organizations lobbied the 
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Commission, the European Parliament, the European Council and the German government intensively. 
  
Some observations clearly support the LI theory. For example the national-level interest 
organizations studied here focused their main lobbying efforts on political institutions in 
Germany, doing their outmost to influence the government’s political position. This is only 
natural, as all interest organizations normally focus on the political level where they have their 
primary affiliation. There they also enjoy the greatest legitimacy in representing the 
constituency to which decisionmakers must relate (see Eising, 2007a; Mahoney, 2007). 
Germany’s political positions and actions in the EU negotiations were very much in line with 
viewpoints held by the renewable energy industry. Moreover, the German government knew 
that it was essentially backed by large sectors of the population – including political parties, 
the environmental movement, and a majority in the Bundestag (Dagger, 2009, p. 99). The 
approach to the Directive taken by the organizations as well as the government is in line with 
Moravcsik’s LI argumentation: to remain in office, governments in democratic societies must 
have support from ‘a coalition of domestic voters, parties, interest groups and bureaucracies’ 
(1993, pp. 483–484). Moreover, the outcome of the Directive, national choice of support 
mechanisms, was essentially in line with LI in maintaining national sovereignty.  
Still, LI seemingly cannot explain the full extent of lobbying behaviour. Our findings 
indicate that the German interest organizations placed high priority on lobbying also at the EU 
level, reflecting the key importance and salience of the issues at stake. These organizations 
conducted multi-level lobbying regardless of their size and resource base in terms of funding 
and staff, and whether or not they had their own EU office (interviews BDI, BBE, BEE and 
BWE, 2011; BDEW 2011a and b). This stands somewhat in contrast to earlier studies, which 
have argued that multi-level lobbying is normally feasible only for large and wealthy 
businesses and their interest organizations (see e.g. Eising, 2007c). Our results support the 
views of Beyers and Kerremans (2012, p. 279), who argue that issue characteristics such as 
potential cost and salience enhance the likelihood of national interest organizations to engage 
in multi-level lobbying, in contrast to LI expectations. 
What, then, of MLG? Our main observations that support MLG expectations can be 
summed up as following: First, the German interest organizations all lobbied the EU 
institutions directly and/or together with other national interest organizations. Using fellow 
nationals as ‘door openers’ to the EU system is a frequent finding in political research (see 
e.g. Michelmann, 1978), and is also seen here. Second, all German interest organizations 
lobbied EU institutions indirectly through their own EU-level interest organizations 
(interviews BBE, BEE, BWE, BDI, 2011; interview BDEW, 2011a). This is how national 
interest organizations typically defend their political positions at the EU level (see e.g. Eising, 
2007a). Third, the interest organizations coordinated their political positions at the national 
and at the EU levels. Additionally, at both political levels, the renewables interest 
organizations also coordinated their political positions with informal long-time coalition 
partners – Greenpeace Germany and Greenpeace EU in particular (interviews BEE, BBE, 
BWE, EPIA, EWEA and EREF, 2011).  
Such shared positions signal to decision makers that some political positions have 
broad support, which increases their credibility. Cooperation is also a way of pooling 
resources for more efficient application (Mahoney, 2007). All interviewees explained that they 
had limited resources. The strategy of creating and sustaining complex multilevel advocacy 
coalitions helped to boost their political leverage, akin to what Sabatier (1998) describes with 
his Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). The renewables industry gradually constructed an 
extensive network which included environmental organizations, other national renewables 
interest organizations and private renewables enterprises. In connection with the Renewables 
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Directive, they also established new contacts and improved existing ones, at the EU as well as 
national levels (interviews BEE and BWE, 2011b). However, in contradiction to Coen’s 
(2005, p. 205) descriptions of coalitions as ‘short-life issue networks’ typical of public and 
business interest organizations, our findings indicate that the coalitions were rather long-term. 
Not all interest organizations were equally active, however: the data show that the larger 
organizations, such as BDI, BDEW and BEE lobbied EU institutions more frequently than the 
small organization in the sample, BBE. The German Renewable Energies Federation, BEE, 
acted as a leader for the whole German renewable industry. BDEW and BDI had similar roles 
with regard to the German utilities industry and the German energy-intensive industry. 
As expected, the European-level interest organizations lobbied the EU institutions 
intensively (see e.g. Coen, 2007). The Commission and the European Parliament were the 
institutions most frequently targeted by all interest organizations in the sample. Relations to 
these institutions were far from new: these organizations had become typical insiders, which 
facilitated their access to the political processes. EUFORES’ long-time support was probably 
especially crucial in this context. In contrast to some earlier lobbying studies that have 
indicated that the Commission was the single major target (see e.g. Lehmann, 2009, p. 39), we 
find that the interest organizations here also lobbied the European Parliament intensely. That 
probably reflects the Parliament’s increased powers, as well as the fact that it has traditionally 
been seen as the EU’s ‘greenest institution’. These multi-venue lobbying strategies and their 
implementation reveal good insights into the EU’s political processes, similar to what Coen 
and Richardson (2009) describe as typical of industrial lobbyists in the European Union.  
Also at the EU level, the organizations lobbied according to their resources. The 
largest renewables interest organization in terms of staff, EWEA, followed the political 
processes very closely and met with more people than did, for example, the smaller EPIA. 
While EPIA concentrated on like-minded individuals within the European Parliament and 
elsewhere, EWEA lobbied both ‘friends and foes’. In addition, EWEA was the only 
organization to conduct a political campaign specifically aimed at decision makers (interviews 
EWEA, EPIA, EREF and EURELECTRIC, 2011). Thus, EWEA, with of its sizeable 
resources, could function as a leader and broker on behalf of the whole European renewable 
energy industry, together with EREC, the umbrella organization.  
These observations of the EU-level interest organizations also support the hypothesis 
based on the MLG theory. MLG outlines not only possible ‘uploading’ of influence and 
targeted lobbying behaviour at different political levels, but also ‘downloading’ to lower 
levels of governance (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). For example, the Commission may use 
national-level interest organizations to introduce and legitimize policies within the member-
states (see e.g. Eikeland, 2011). Our observations indicate such ‘downloading’ in three cases. 
First, the European interest organizations lobbied at the national level by meeting with 
governments and permanent representations they regarded as particularly important, like those 
of Germany, Spain and France (interviews EURELECTRIC, EPIA, EWEA and EREF, 2011). 
Second, the European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) assisted the Bundesverband 
WindEnergie (BWE) through knowledge transfer (interview EWEA, 2011). Third, 
EURELECTRIC depended on its members to disseminate the common political positions 
agreed upon within its committees (interview EURELECTRIC, 2011).  
Therefore, expectations derived from Hooghe and Mark’s version of MLG would 
seem to fit well with the lobbying behaviour observed. That confirms the explanatory 
potential of this theory when applied to industrial lobbying on EU energy policy: interest 
organizations do ‘shop’ lobbying venues at multiple levels. Our observations meet MLG 
expectations regarding the lobbying behaviour of the national interest organizations and EU-
level interest organizations as well. Clearly, both sets of organizations do perceive – and, 
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more importantly – relate to the European Union as a genuinely multilevel system.  
In line with the arguments of Eising (2007b) and Beyers and Kerreman (2012), we see 
that the national interest organizations lobbied EU institutions in cases where the EU 
legislation was of high relevance to them. Still, the findings do not give support to Klüver’s 
(2013, p.152) claim that national and European interest organizations are equally active in 
lobbying EU institutions. We find that national organizations focused their primary efforts on 
the national level, and European organizations on the EU level.  
In this context, two observations can be offered concerning phenomena that have been 
little commented upon in the literature on EU lobbying: First, national interest organizations 
can create networks with each other to enhance political leverage and mutual trust; such 
networks should be further explored in future research. Second, at least one of the national 
interest organizations collaborated with private companies in order to share tasks and improve 
lobbying strength. Also this kind of cooperation offers possibilities for further exploration, 
since recent findings indicate that companies conduct considerable lobbying of the EU 
system, and that it might be the ‘aggregated information supply, citizen support and economic 
power of coalitions’ that matters for influence (Klüver 2013, p.141 and p. 200).   
Thus, we have seen that the lobbying efforts of interest organizations were genuinely 
multilevel because the EU institutions were deemed important for the outcome of the 
negotiations. Liberal Intergovernmentalism fails to explain important aspects of this lobbying 
behaviour, rendering LI less useful as a tool for understanding lobbying in EU energy policy. 
Future studies should take into account the role of cooperation between lobbying at different 
levels of government. This kind of coordination and cooperation should also be investigated 
when studying causal processes, such as why legislation like the Renewables Directive ended 
up in its present form. Still, the fact that multi-level lobbying did take place is in itself not 
enough to discredit LI as an analytical tool for understanding political processes in the EU.  
  
Conclusions 
Using two theories – Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Multi-Level Governance – this study 
has addressed the following research questions: 
1) What lobbying strategies did the interest organizations of Germany’s energy industries use to 
influence the formulation of the EU Renewables Directive? 
2) What do these strategies tell about perceptions of where the real decision making power in the EU is 
situated? Is it located at the national level, or at the national and EU levels?  
 
The LI theory was supported by only some of the findings. While the accumulation of interest 
on the national level can account for some of the lobbying behaviour of interest organizations, 
it cannot explain the full extent of the lobbying (and accompanying coordination) that these 
organizations conducted in order to influence EU decisions. Altogether, LI seems inadequate 
for explaining the actual lobbying behaviour of interest organizations as well as their 
understanding of EU decision making processes. Our findings indicate that they regard 
decision making in the EU as something significantly different from (and more complex than) 
mere decisions based on negotiations by sovereign states in the Council of Ministers or the 
European Council. When EU decisions are particularly important for them, interest 
organizations conduct multi-level venue shopping (Baumgarter and Jones, 1991) within the 
EU’s multi-level governance system. Otherwise, it would be rational to lobby only decision 
makers at the national level, or the intergovernmental EU bodies. These findings are in line 
with earlier research, such as that of Eising (2004, p. 212), who argues that ‘the concept of 
35 
 
multi-level governance captures the essence of interest intermediation in EU best’. Further, 
similar to Dür and Mateo (2012) and Beyers and Kerremans (2012, p. 276), this study finds 
that the national business associations studied frequently lobby EU legislation on salient 
issues. This seems to be an increasing trend. On the other hand, this study has also shown that 
all organizations in the sample, also the smallest ones, participated in such lobbying, which 
appears to be a rather uncommon finding.   
Even in one of the most national of all policy domains – energy policy – Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism has proven inadequate for explaining the perceptions and actual 
lobbying behaviour of key interests. The limited leverage of LI can be illustrated by three 
examples: First, all the German interest organizations lobbied institutions at both the national 
and at the EU levels. Second, national and European interest organizations – the renewables 
industry in particular – participated in informal multi-level political coalitions, where they 
coordinated their political positions, pooled resources, shared information and developed 
common strategies. Third, all the EU-level interest organizations lobbied both the core EU 
institutions and key national governments. This outcome shows that the interest organizations 
are able to exploit the multi-level dynamics of the EU, including allying with other interest 
organizations at different levels, in order to enhance their impact. Further, today’s Euro-
associations for the energy industries are relatively large, well-endowed and enjoying insider 
status. This means that their presence can contribute to better-informed EU policies in a 
political system increasingly characterized by multi-level governance. LI cannot account for 
these phenomena. Given the ‘most likely’ character of the policy field, this indicates serious 
shortcomings in the explanatory leverage of LI theory in relation to EU lobbying.  
We find support for MLG theory in the majority of the empirical findings. Future 
studies on industrial lobbying should take this into account, enquiring into multi-level 
lobbying strategies where it is reasonable to expect interest organizations to lobby at multiple 
levels, rather than focusing solely on the national or the international level. With the EU 
steadily increasing in depth and scope, research attention should focus on coordinated 
lobbying, as interest organizations appear to lobby across political levels to an increasing 
extent. Finally, we note that lobbying by complex multi-level advocacy coalitions may be 
decisive for political outcomes in the EU, which testifies to the substantial importance of 
coordinated lobbying behaviour and coalition formation across levels.   
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Appendix 
 
Respondents, by affiliation 
 
Germany 
Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energie (BEE) 
Bundesverband BioEnergie (BBE) 
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Bundesverband WindEnergie (BWE) (2 interviewees) 
Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI) 
Bundesverband der Energie und Wasserwirtschaft (BDEW) (2 interviewees) 
 
The EU-level 
European Photovoltaic Industry Association (EPIA) 
European Renewable Energies Federation (EREF) 
European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) 
Union of the Electricity Industry (EURELECTRIC)  
 
Acronyms and abbreviations 
 
Table 9.3 
AEBIOM European Biomass Association 
AIB Association of Issuing Bodies 
BBE Bundesverband BioEnergie e. V. (German Bioenergy Association) 
BDEW  Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft e. V. (German Association of Energy 
and Water Industries) 
BDI Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e. V. (Federation of German Industry) 
BEE Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energie e. V. (German Renewable Energy Federation) 
BMU Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit (Federal Ministry 
for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety) 
BMELV Bundesministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Verbrauchershutz (Federal 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection) 
BMWi Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (Federal Ministry of Economics 
and Technology) 
BSW Bundesverband Solarwirtschaft e. V. (German Solar Industry Association) 
BUND Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland e. V. (Friends of the Earth Germany) 
BUSINESSEUROPE The Confederation of European Business 
BWE Bundesverband WindEnergie e. V. (German Wind Energy Association) 
CDU/CSU Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, Christlich-Soziale Union e. V. in 
Bayern (Christian Democratic Union of Germany and the Christian Democratic Union 
of Bavaria) 
CEPI Confederation of European Paper Industries 
CAN Climate Action Network 
DBV Deutscher Bauernverband e.V (German Farmer’s Association) 
DG TREN Directorates General for Energy and Transport, today DG Energy 
ECR European Conservative and Reformist Group 
EEB European Environment Bureau 
EFET European Federation of Energy Traders 
EPIA European Photovoltaic Industry Association 
EPP European People’s Party 
EREC European Renewable Energy Council 
EREF European Renewable Energies Federation asbl. 
EU ETS EU Emissions Trading System 
EUFORES European Forum for Renewable Energy Sources 
EURELECTRIC Union of the Electricity Industry 
EWEA European Wind Energy Association 
FiT Feed-in tariff 
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party) 
FoE Europe Friends of the Earth Europe 
IG BCE Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau, Chemie und Energie (Mining, Chemical and Energy 
Industrial Union) 
GEC Green electricity certificate 
IG Metall Industriegewerkschaft Metall (German Metalworkers’ Federation) 
ITRE Committee on Industry, Research and Energy 
LI Liberal intergovernmentalism 
MEP Member of the European Parliament 
MLG Multi-level Governance 
RECS Renewable Energy Certificate System 
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany) 
VDMA Verband Deutscher Maschinen und Anlagenbau e.V. (German Engineering Federation) 
VIK Verband der Industriellen Energie und Kraftwirtschaft (Association of the Industrial 
Energy and Power Industry) 
WFC World Future Council 
WWF EU World Wildlife Fund for Nature Europe 
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